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A B S T R A C T
We tested whether mere source attribution is suﬃcient to cause polarization between groups, even on con-
sensual non-divisive positions. Across four studies (N=2182), using samples from Germany, the UK, and the
USA, agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution. In contrast, atheists agreed less
with brief aphorisms when they were presented as Bible verses (Studies 1 and 2), whereas Christians agreed
more (Study 2). Democrats and Republicans (USA) and Labour supporters and Conservative supporters (UK)
agreed more with politically non-divisive aphorisms that were presented as originating from a politician be-
longing to their own party (e.g., Clinton, Trump, Corbyn) than with the same aphorisms when they were pre-
sented as originating from a politician belonging to the rival party (Studies 3 and 4). This source attribution
eﬀect was not moderated by education, amount of thinking about the aphorisms, identiﬁcation with the ingroup,
trust, dissonance, fear of reproach, or attitude strength. We conclude that source attribution fundamentally
interferes with epistemic progress in debate because of the way in which attributions of statements to sources
powerfully aﬀects reasoning about their arguments.
1. Introduction
In the present research, we examine whether agreement on un-
controversial, non-partisan issues is reduced by the simple knowledge
that they are endorsed by “the other side”. There are increasingly dis-
trustful and entrenched divisions between religious and political ideo-
logical groups. For example, in the USA, diﬀerences in religious
ideology are manifested in the lower trust felt toward atheists than
other religious groups (e.g., Muslims; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann,
2006). In 2014, atheists and Christians, especially Evangelical Chris-
tians, rated each other as the coldest group on a feeling thermometer
(Lipka, 2014). There are also remarkable diﬀerences in political
ideology. Only 9% of US-American married couples consist of Demo-
crat-Republican pairs (Rosenfeld, Reuben, & Maja Falcon, 2015), and
the degree of political attitude concordance between spouses exceeds
the concordance in personality and physical traits (Alford, Hatemi,
Hibbing, Martin, & Eaves, 2011).
The degree of discord between political ideological groups has in-
creased in recent decades (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). For example, in
1960, 33% of Democrats and Republicans viewed their own party
members as intelligent and 27% considered the opposing party
members as intelligent (averaged across both groups). By 2008, this gap
had widened to 62% versus 14%, respectively (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes,
2012). Similarly, the proportion of party members who would be
somewhat or very unhappy if their children were to marry someone
who supports the other party was ten times larger in 2010 than in 1960
(Iyengar et al., 2012). Moreover, the degree of discord is often stronger
among more highly educated supporters of both parties, especially on
issues related to environmental protection or moral issues, such as
abortion and homosexuality (Pew Research Center, 2016). A range of
studies suggest that conservatives and liberals are equally biased
against each other (Ditto et al., 2017; Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017),
and these divisions are so well-known that it is no longer surprising to
see disagreement between these ideological groups on divisive con-
temporary issues.
However, a fundamental question is whether this disagreement even
applies when the opposing group makes non-divisive claims to holding
the same core values, eliciting disagreement where there should be
agreement. If so, this eﬀect would be evidence that mere source attri-
bution is, by itself, a powerful barrier to resolving existing ideological
and political diﬀerences. This issue is important because shared values
are often seen as a bridge that can help to forge agreement. For
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instance, after the attacks on 11.09.2001, the United Nations Secretary
General (New York, Sept. 24) argued for the importance of ﬁnding “a
framework of shared values and understanding…” Yet, it could be argued
that opposing ideological groups already attempt to reach out through
statements aﬃrming shared values, but these pledges fail to elicit
shared understanding because people know who makes the statements.
This potential eﬀect of source attributions on agreement with the same
aphorisms is the focus of the present research. Here, we provide the ﬁrst
direct examination of whether source knowledge prevents aﬃrmations
of shared values from bridging ideological divisions, focusing on several
polarized ideological groups: atheists, Christians, US-Democrats, US-
Republicans, supporters of the UK-Conservative and UK-Labour party.
Further, we investigate a range of previously unexplored moderators to
get a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of the source
attribution eﬀect.
1.1. Group identity and persuasion
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categoriza-
tion theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) provide
a useful theoretical framework to understand disagreement between
ideological groups. These theories suggest that ideological divisions
between groups are likely to be inﬂated when group identity is salient.
Social identity theory postulates that membership of social groups
provides an important basis for social identity and that people are
therefore motivated to ﬁnd ways of distinguishing their own group
from the outgroup in ways that reﬂect well on the ingroup.
The relevance of source attribution to intergroup agreement is il-
lustrated in a study that asked 1000 Jewish pupils to judge whether
they agreed with the action of the main character of a short story
(Tamarin, 1966). In one condition, pupils were presented with a short
passage from the Old Testament book of Joshua. Joshua, a Jewish
leader, is accurately described as conquering a city and slaughtering
everyone inside it, including children and animals. Sixty percent of the
pupils endorsed Joshua's actions. However, when the same passage was
said to describe the actions of General Lin in China 3000 years ago, just
7% of the pupils endorsed General Lin's actions. Similarly, Jews and
Palestinians agreed less with a peace plan for the Israel-Palestinian
conﬂict when it was attributed to the “other side” (Maoz, Ward, Katz, &
Ross, 2002).
A possible mechanism underlying these eﬀects are that ingroup
members see each other as similar, and as more diﬀerent from outgroup
members, in accordance with self-categorization theory (Turner et al.,
1987). This greater perceived similarity inﬂuences trustworthiness and
persuasion (Faraji-Rad, Samuelsen, & Warlop, 2015). A related ex-
planation was proposed by Asch (1948): Based on the ﬁndings of Lorge
and Curtiss (1936), Asch argued that the perceived prestige of authors
plays a role in how statements are assessed. This hypothesis was sup-
ported by more recent studies of the perceived prestige of leaders,
which was operationalized as the leader's charisma: Leaders described
with in-group characteristics were evaluated as more charismatic and
authentic (Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, &
Spears, 2006; Steﬀens, Mols, Haslam, & Okimoto, 2016; see also Mols,
2012). At the same time, people may inherently distrust the outgroup
sources more (e.g., Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005). Thus,
the inﬂuence of someone from the ingroup is likely to be higher because
ingroup members are perceived as more trustworthy.
This ingroup bias extends to the processing of persuasive messages:
Information from ingroup members is more persuasive (Mackie,
Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990;
McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994). For example, drawing
on Turner's (1982, 1985) work, Mackie et al. (1990) reasoned that an
argument from the ingroup is persuasive “for the very reason that it is
seen as reﬂecting, deﬁning, and informing about social reality for
people similar to the recipient” (p. 813). To test this assumption,
Mackie et al. asked psychology undergraduate students to read a
message advocating abolition of the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT)
exams. Participants were either informed that the message came from
an ingroup member (a delegate from their own university) or an out-
group (another university). The message arguments were pretested to
be either weak or strong. Participants were more persuaded when the
content was strong as opposed to weak, but only when the message was
said to come from an ingroup member. When the message was said to
come from an outgroup member, participants were equally un-
persuaded by strong and weak messages, showing that the eﬀect of
argument strength is moderated by source attribution.
However, people are blind to this inﬂuence (Cohen, 2003), and this
eﬀect occurs only when group membership is considered to be relevant
for the attitude issue (Wyer, 2010). Drawing on self-categorization
theory (Turner et al., 1987) and the work of Mackie et al. (1992, 1990),
Wyer (2010) manipulated whether the attitude issue was relevant to
group membership. For example, in Study 1, conducted in the USA,
Wyer presented members of the Democratic and Republican parties
with arguments on issues that were either relevant to their party af-
ﬁliation (legalization of euthanasia) or irrelevant (increasing credit
requirements for undergraduate students). The arguments were pre-
sented as originating either from the ingroup or from the outgroup, and
as either in favor or opposing the attitude issue. When the topic was
relevant to the source (euthanasia), the origin had a strong eﬀect: When
the arguments were pro-euthanasia, participants supported euthanasia
more when the arguments came from an ingroup than outgroup
member. Similarly, when the arguments were against euthanasia, par-
ticipants opposed euthanasia more when arguments came from an in-
group than outgroup member. Importantly, when the topic was irrele-
vant to the source (credit requirements), the eﬀects were weaker or
non-existent.
What remains unclear is whether value-laden aphorisms would be
judged in a similar way to the relevant or irrelevant arguments used by
Wyer (2010). This is important because much of the most striking
content of political speeches consists of truistic, value laden assertions
rather than arguments. Examples are the political slogans used during
the most recent election campaigns of the US-American presidential
candidate Hillary Clinton (“Stronger together”; in 2016), the British
Prime Minister Theresa May (“Strong and stable leadership”; 2017), or
the German Chancellor Angela Merkel (“For a Germany where we live
well and happy”; 2017). None of these slogans contains any substantive
argument. The endpoints of the slogans are uncontroversial truisms:
Most if not all parties would share the aims of Americans being
“stronger together”, providing the UK with “strong and stable leader-
ship”, or enabling German citizens to “live well and happy”. Never-
theless, the arguments are linked to diﬀerent politicians or political
parties, and the implications of attaching the same aphoristic state-
ments to opposing parties have not been examined. We expect that even
aphorisms or truisms can be subject to strong ingroup biases, eﬀectively
negating their ability to bridge divisions between groups.
Overall, then, the eﬀects of source attribution on persuasiveness
have been shown in a variety of ways in relation to controversial topics
(e.g., military aggression, potentially complex peace settlements be-
tween opposing sides) with polarizing content (e.g., Cohen, 2003;
Mackie et al., 1990; Maoz et al., 2002) or criticisms of the ingroup (e.g.,
Hornsey & Esposo, 2009). Eﬀects such as these do not always replicate
across context, sample type, and time (e.g., Hanel & Vione, 2016;
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), and it is important to identify
boundary conditions. Here, we probe whether the eﬀect of group
membership is so powerful that it even aﬀects the endorsement of non-
divisive aphorisms that reﬂect shared values. Speciﬁcally, we in-
vestigate whether source attributions aﬀect responses even to state-
ments that could be bridges for rapprochement between ideological
groups: uncontroversial aphorisms that are endorsed in both groups.
Researching this issue is important for theoretical and practical
reasons. From a theoretical perspective, evidence of a source attribution
eﬀect on the extent of agreement with consensual aphorisms would
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point to the need for potential diﬀerent mediating mechanisms. In
previous paradigms, rejecting a message calling for action would be
easier when it comes from an outgroup member rather than an ingroup
member because an outgroup member would be much less likely to
monitor whether the action takes place (see the literature on ingroup
favoritism, Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). In contrast, consensual
aphorisms are linked to common values and interests. If adding an
outgroup source attribution to such statements still reduces agreement,
the evidence would call for a broader theoretical perspective on the
impact of sources. It would be important to also consider varied me-
chanisms through which the attempted introduction of a framework of
shared values between groups yields an impact (e.g., increased pro-
cessing, identity protection).
From a practical perspective, it is important to seek ways of bridging
major contemporary societal divisions along religious (e.g., atheists vs
Christians) and political lines (Democrats vs Republicans and Labour
supporters vs Conservative supporters). Not only are there acrimonious
debates across these group divides (Dawkins, 2006; Iyengar et al.,
2012); people are inclined to infer greater diﬀerences in values between
groups than there actually are (Hanel, 2016; Hanel, Maio, & Manstead,
2018; see also Westfall, Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015). Actual dif-
ferences between conservatives and liberals or religious and non-re-
ligious people are small for several important contemporary topics. For
example, the quality and frequency of moral behaviors do not diﬀer
between religious and non-religious participants (Hofmann, Wisneski,
Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). Another large-scale study found a high degree
of consensus among demographic groups, including Democrats and
Republicans, regarding wealth redistribution: All groups preferred a
more equal distribution of wealth in the USA, compared to the status
quo (Norton & Ariely, 2011). If people are resistant to these shared
values and goals simply because they are advocated by the outgroup,
then it would become important to inform people about this bias and to
study ways to address it.
1.2. Overview of the present studies
Across four studies, we investigated a wide range of diﬀerent ex-
treme religious and political groups. We recruited atheists as partici-
pants in Study 1, atheists and Christians in Study 2, US-Democrats and
US-Republicans in Study 3, and British citizens who supported either
the Conservative or Labour party to varying degrees in Study 4.
Participants in all studies were asked to evaluate aphorisms: Bible
verses and quotes from Greek philosophers in Studies 1 and 2, quotes
from leading politicians of the Democratic and Republican party in
Study 3, and value-laden statements of important values derived from
the Portrait Value Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001). In Studies 2–4,
we tested whether the two groups disagreed more when the origin of
each statement was presented, but only weakly or negligibly when the
aphorisms were unattributed. Thus, unlike previous studies (e.g.,
Platow et al., 2006; Tamarin, 1966), we also tested whether aphorisms
attributed to an outgroup would be disliked more than in a condition
when the same aphorisms were unattributed. We explored a range of
potential moderators that were mainly unexplored in previous research,
including identiﬁcation with the ingroup (Study 1), amount of ela-
boration (Studies 1 and 3), level of education (Study 3), strength of
political preference (Studies 3 and 4), discomfort about disagreeing
with the ingroup, fear of reproach from the ingroup, and attitude
strength (Study 4). We provide a brief rationale for each moderator at
the beginning of each study. The data and R coding for all studies can
be found at https://osf.io/csfmd/.
2. Study 1
The aim of Study 1 was to test whether US- and UK-based atheists
would agree less with brief aphorisms when they were presented as
originating from a Christian source (Bible) or a Jewish source (Tanakh,
the holy book of Jews). The considerable overlap in content between
the Tanakh and the Old Testament allowed us to veridically present
aphorisms from one source as coming from the other source. This
paradigm allowed us to test whether atheists devaluate religious
sources per se or simply sources from a speciﬁc, disliked religious group
(i.e., Christians) – and thereby help to determine the outgroup for the
following study. We expected atheists to have a generally negative view
of the Bible, based on the popularity of recent books belonging to the
so-called ‘new Atheism’ wave that attacks religion, especially
Christianity and the Bible (e.g., Dawkins, 2006; Harris, 2006).
We also tested whether this eﬀect would be stronger for atheists
who identify strongly with being an atheist, and whether the eﬀect is
more apparent under spontaneous or deliberate processing conditions.
We operationalized the latter by either presenting aphorisms and source
attribution together (i.e., spontaneous condition) or allowing the par-
ticipants to think ﬁrst about each aphorism before presenting its (ap-
parent) origin (i.e., deliberate condition). We reasoned in line with
previous research (Horcajo, Petty, & Briñol, 2010) that presenting the
aphorism ﬁrst allows participants to process the message more ex-
tensively, while presenting the (apparent) origin together reduces depth
of processing or elaboration.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Design and participants
We used a 2× 2 between-subject design with source attribution
(Bible vs Tanakh) and deliberation (spontaneous vs deliberate) as fac-
tors. A ﬁfth condition was added as a control condition, in which the
aphorisms were presented without attribution.
One hundred eighty-four participants completed the survey.
Twenty-two participants were excluded because they indicated that
they either believed in God (n= 1), were unsure whether they believed
in God (11), or did not care (10). These exclusions were necessary
because it was not clear whether these participants would or would not
have favorable views toward the Bible. The ﬁnal sample of 162 parti-
cipants had a mean age of 39.20 years (SD=13.51), and included 55
women (34.20%, one participant did not respond to the gender item),
and 80 participants who had at least graduated from high school, while
the remaining 82 had a lower educational level. We asked around 20
moderators of mainly British and American atheist Facebook groups
and pages to distribute a brief advertisement for this study, or we
posted the advertisement on their pages ourselves. All participants
completed the survey online and were not compensated. A sensitivity
analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang,
2009) showed that our sample was suﬃcient to detect small-to-medium
eﬀects of f≥ 0.22 with a power of 0.80 for a between-subjects ANOVA
testing the interaction between source attribution and deliberation. Our
sample is also suﬃcient to detect small-to-medium eﬀects of f≥ 0.22
within a one-way analysis with source attribution as the factor (Bible vs
Tanakh vs none), again with a power of 0.80.
2.1.2. Material and procedure
Participants were told that they would be participating in a study about
personal beliefs and identity. Next, participants were randomly allocated to
one of the ﬁve conditions, which presented the same eight Bible/Tanakh
aphorisms (i.e., verses) and eight quotes from Greek philosophers.
Participants rated how much they agreed with 16 aphorisms on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The quotes
from the Greek philosophers were added to avoid the possibility that par-
ticipants disagreed with the aphorisms only because they came from a re-
ligious text, without reading them properly. These quotes were always la-
beled as being from Greek philosophers. In the experimental conditions,
aphorisms were either labeled as originating from the Bible or the Tanakh.
We reported the book, the chapter, and the verse number of each aphorism,
which is a unique and (mostly) universal identiﬁer for Bible and Tanakh
verses. Examples include, “It is better to heed the rebuke of a wise person
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than to listen to the song of fools (The Bible, Ecclesiastes 7:5)” (or “The
Tanakh, Qoheleth 7.5” in the Tanakh condition) and “No evil can happen to
a good man, either in life or after death (Greek philosopher, Plato,
427–347).”
To test whether disagreement with the aphorisms labeled as origi-
nating from the Bible or Tanakh would be reduced or enhanced if the
source attribution was given either before or after the aphorism, either
the source attribution (e.g., “The Bible, Ecclesiastes 7:5”) was presented
for 3 s before the aphorism and response scale appeared (spontaneous
condition), or the aphorism was presented ﬁrst and then the attribution
and the response scale appeared after 5 s (deliberate condition). In the
control condition, only the aphorisms with the response scale were
presented, without attribution or delay.
Next, all participants completed a 14-item in-group identiﬁcation scale
(Leach et al., 2008), which measures ﬁve factors of ingroup identiﬁcation:
solidarity (e.g., “I feel committed to atheists”, α=0.52), satisfaction (“It is
pleasant to be an atheist”, α=0.35), centrality (e.g., “The fact that I am an
atheist is an important part of my identity”, α=0.73), individual self-ste-
reotyping (e.g., “I am similar to the average atheistic person”, α=0.78),
and ingroup homogeneity (e.g., “Atheists are very similar to each other”,
α=0.88). Responses were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The overall consistency of the 14-
item scale was α=0.77. Then participants were asked about how often
they engage in religious behaviors (e.g., praying, working in an honorary
capacity in religious communities), whether they are member of a religious
community, and whether they believed in God.
2.2. Data analysis
As a measure of eﬀect size, we report Cohen's U3 because of the
intuitive ease with which eﬀect size can be interpreted when comparing
two groups. U3 shows the percentage of people from one group scoring
higher than the mean of the other group. The average U3 in the pub-
lished social psychological literature is 66.6% (transformed from
r=0.21; Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 2003), or 58.7% when
taking publication bias into account (cf. Open Science Collaboration,
2015). As U3 cannot be used for interactions in ANOVA designs, in
these cases we report the generalized eta square ηG
2 , computed with the
ez package in R (Lawrence, 2015), because of its comparability across
many research designs (Olejnik & Algina, 2003). Finally, we also report
Cohen's d because of its widespread use.
2.3. Results
First, we conducted a two-way ANOVA with source attribution
(Bible vs Tanakh) and deliberation (spontaneous vs deliberate) as the
between-subjects factors and agreement with the religious verses as
dependent variable. Although the interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1,
126)= 0.70, p= .41, ηG
2 =0.01, the main eﬀect of source attribution
was, F(1, 126)= 7.78, p= .006, ηG
2 =0.06, d=0.52, Cohen's
U3= 70, as was the main eﬀect of deliberation, F(1, 126)= 4.45,
p= .037, ηG
2 =0.03, d=0.41, U3= 66. Participants agreed more with
the aphorisms when they were presented as originating from the
Tanakh (M=4.45, SD=0.65) than from the Bible (M=4.12,
SD=0.64). Unexpectedly, participants agreed more when the source
attribution was presented before the aphorism (M=4.41, SD=0.65),
than when the source attribution was presented after the aphorism
(M=4.14, SD=0.65).
In a next step, we compared the agreement with Bible and Tanakh
aphorisms, averaged across the deliberation conditions, with the
Fig. 1. Mean agreement with Bible/Tanakh aphorisms as a function of source attribution (Study 1).
Note. The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
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control condition. The one-way ANOVA was signiﬁcant, F(1,
160)= 7.46, p= .007, ηG
2 =0.04. Post-hoc tests using Tukey's HSD
revealed that participants in the control condition agreed marginally
more (M=4.45, SD=0.67) with the aphorisms than did participants
in the Bible conditions, p= .054, d=0.51, U3=69. The diﬀerence
between the control condition and the Tanakh condition was non-sig-
niﬁcant, p= .998 (see Fig. 1). Additionally, we tested whether con-
trolling for agreement with the quotes of the Greek philosophers would
change the pattern of result (i.e., to control for response biases). This
was not the case: The one-way ANCOVA with the three between-sub-
jects conditions (Bible vs Tanakh vs control) remained signiﬁcant, F(2,
158)= 9.26, p < .001.
Finally, we tested for potential moderators in a series of regression
analyses, with the potential moderator (identity or education) included
as the continuous variable, and source attribution as a between-subjects
factor (the Bible and Tanakh conditions were both tested against the
control condition). Thus, we computed 7 two-way interactions between
the moderators (ﬁve ingroup factors, overall ingroup factor, and edu-
cation) and source attribution (Bible vs control and Tanakh vs control).
Regarding the results for the ingroup identity scores, none of the 12
two-way interactions (Leach et al., 2008) was signiﬁcant, either for the
overall 14-item version or for the ﬁve subscales (Bs < |0.25|, ps >
.07). In contrast, the interaction of level of education with Bible vs
control was signiﬁcant (B=−0.40, SE=0.15, p= .007), as was the
interaction of level of education with Tanakh vs control (B=−0.49,
SE=0.15, p= .002). A comparison of the lower with the higher edu-
cated participants (median split) revealed that lower educated partici-
pants agreed less with the aphorisms when they were labeled as Bible
(M=4.03, SD=0.63) or Tanakh aphorisms (M=4.31, SD=0.68)
than in the control condition (M=4.86, SD=0.46), whereas this eﬀect
was not observed for the higher educated participants (M=4.23,
SD=0.64 for Bible, M=4.61, SD=0.58 for Tanakh, and M=4.38,
SD=0.65 for control). This suggests that lower educated participants
were more strongly inﬂuenced by the origins of the statement than were
higher educated participants.
2.4. Discussion
Atheists agreed less with aphorisms when they were presented as
coming from the Bible than when they were unattributed. However,
this eﬀect did not occur when the aphorisms were attributed to the
Tanakh. This pattern of ﬁndings shows that British and American
atheists have a speciﬁc dislike of the Bible, and may reﬂect the fact that
Jews are not considered by atheists to be an especially relevant out-
group. This explanation is supported by examination of the posts of the
Facebook groups from which we recruited our participants. A high
proportion of posts ridiculed the Bible or pointed out (apparent) con-
tradictions within the Bible, but virtually none directly attacked the
Jewish religion or presented them as a despised outgroup. However, we
suspect that a replication of this study conducted among Israeli atheists
would reveal a similar eﬀect for the Tanakh aphorisms, given the
greater relevance of the outgroup.
Apart from level of education, none of the putative moderators had
a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Extent of deliberation and strength of atheist
identity failed to moderate whether atheists agreed with Bible aphor-
isms less when they were labeled as such. It is worth noting that the ﬁrst
of these results stands in contrast to previous research (e.g. Horcajo
et al., 2010), where it was found that whether the source attribution
preceded or followed a message had a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
3. Study 2
We aimed to replicate and extend the ﬁndings of Study 1 by re-
cruiting both atheists and Christians as participants and by using a
broader range of aphorisms. Each group of participants rated 20
aphorisms, 12 from the Bible and 8 from Greek philosophers. They were
presented either as from the Bible or without attribution. We assumed
that atheists and Christians would agree in their ratings when the
aphorisms were not labeled as Bible aphorisms but that they would
disagree when they were labeled as originating from the Bible.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Design and participants
A 2 (Worldview: atheist vs Christian)× 2 (Source attribution: Bible
vs no attribution) design was used. Five-hundred ﬁfty-four atheists
(Mage= 29.77, SD=11.42, 60.5% women) and 220 Christian partici-
pants (Mage= 42.99, SD=19.91, 21.9% women) completed the
survey. Seventy-two participants who reported that they did not care
about the existence of God (i.e., agnostics) were excluded, because it
was unclear whether or not they would have favorable views toward
the Bible. Of the excluded agnostics, 71 were from the atheist sample,1
and one was from the Christian sample. Additionally, we excluded 25
participants from the atheist sample because they reported believing in
God, and ﬁve participants from the Christian sample because they re-
ported not believing in God. We excluded these 30 participants from the
analysis, rather than switching them to the other group, because their
ideological position was ambiguous: Their public commitment (see
below) was at odds with responses given in the survey.
Atheist participants were recruited via Facebook and completed the
survey online. We asked a moderator of a large German-speaking
Facebook group called “Atheism” to distribute an advertisement for the
study, along with a link to an online survey. To recruit Christian par-
ticipants, we visited several Church services or communal meetings of
Christian communities and distributed a paper version of the survey,
along with other measures unrelated to the present study. Christian
participants either completed the survey immediately or completed it at
home and mailed it to the researchers. Participants were not compen-
sated. A sensitivity analysis showed that our sample was suﬃcient to
detect small eﬀects of f≥ 0.10 with a power of 0.80 for a 2 (Worldview:
atheist vs Christian)× 2 (Source attribution: Bible vs no attribution)
design.
3.1.2. Material and procedure
To assess whether labeling aphorisms as originating from the Bible
increases the divide between atheists and Christians, we selected 12
Bible aphorisms from the Old Testament and eight quotes from Greek
philosophers, which were labeled as coming from the Bible in the Bible
origin condition. For eight of the Bible aphorisms, we expected there to
be consensual agreement (e.g., “Whoever loves money never has en-
ough; whoever loves wealth is never satisﬁed with their income” Ecc
5:9, or “A person ﬁnds joy in giving an apt reply – and how good is a
timely word!” Prov 15:23); for the remaining four aphorisms, we ex-
pected there to be consensual disagreement (e.g., “You have set free a
man I had determined should die. Therefore it is your life for his life,
your people for his people.” 1 Kings 20:42). Criteria for selecting the
Bible verses were (1) they should not be well-known and (2) they
should not contain obvious Biblical terms, such as “God” or “Abraham.”
All the Bible aphorisms were taken from a German ecumenical Bible
translation from 1985, with both Catholics and Protestants agreeing on
the content. The eight quotes from Greek philosophers were taken from
Knischek (2009). Examples are “Judgement, not passion should pre-
vail,” and “Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man.” In the
Bible origin condition, all 20 aphorisms were labeled as originating
from the Bible, using the conventional way of citing Bible aphorisms by
reference to the book, chapter, and verse. The eight quotes from Greek
1We tested whether the source attribution did have an eﬀect for the 71 participants
from the atheist sample who identiﬁed themselves as agnostics, to test whether the ex-
clusion was justiﬁed. Agnostics did not agree more or less with aphorisms labeled as Bible
verses than with unlabeled aphorisms, t(68.24)= 0.35, p=73.
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philosophers were said to be from the Old Testament, where similar
aphorisms can be found (e.g., book of Kohelet). Participants indicated
how much they agreed with each of the aphorisms, on a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree) (in the no
attribution condition, the term “Bible verses” was replaced by “state-
ment”).2 To check their belief system (religious, atheist, and agnostic),
participants were asked whether they believed in the existence of God
(yes, no, or I don't care).
3.2. Results
We tested whether participants agreed more with the eight Bible
aphorisms for which we anticipated consensual agreement than with
the four Bible aphorisms for which we anticipated consensual dis-
agreement. This was clearly the case both for atheists and Christians
(ds > 2, ps < .0001; see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Next, we
computed a series of two-way ANOVAs, with worldview (atheist vs
Christian) and source attribution (Bible vs no attribution) as factors.
This breakdown was justiﬁed by a signiﬁcant three-way interaction in a
2 (worldview)× 2 (source attribution)× 3 (type of stimuli: con-
sensually agreed Bible aphorisms, consensually disagreed Bible aphor-
isms, and aphorisms from Greek philosophers) ANOVA, with repeated
measures on the last factor, F(2, 1536)= 6.35, p= .004.
We conducted four two-way ANOVAs, one for each of four depen-
dent variables: all aphorisms combined, consensually disagreed Bible
aphorisms, consensually agreed Bible aphorisms, and aphorisms from
Greek philosophers (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Analysis of
all aphorisms combined revealed a signiﬁcant interaction, F(1,
762)= 23.11, p < .001, ηG
2 =0.03, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
worldview, F(1, 762)= 193.53, p < .001, ηG
2 =0.20, but no main ef-
fect of source attribution, F(1, 762)= 0.03, p= .86, ηG
2 < 0.01. As
expected, the diﬀerence in agreement between atheists and Christians
was larger across all 20 aphorisms when they were labeled as origi-
nating from the Bible, U3=94, than when they were unattributed,
U3= 77 (see Fig. 2). In the Bible origin condition, 94% of Christians
scored higher than the average atheist. Controlling for age and gender
did not aﬀect this pattern of results.
Further comparisons revealed that the predicted eﬀect applied to
both atheists and Christians (see Table 1). That is, when atheists were
told that the 12 Bible aphorisms and 8 quotes originated from the Bible,
they endorsed them less strongly, whereas their Christian counterparts
endorsed them more strongly.
However, this eﬀect was not found for the Bible aphorisms that elicited
consensual disagreement. Analysis of the consensually disagreed Bible
aphorisms revealed only a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of worldview, F(1,
762)=83.97, p < .001, ηG
2 =0.10, reﬂecting the fact that Christians dis-
agreed less with these aphorisms than did their atheist counterparts, re-
gardless of source attribution. Both the main eﬀect of source attribution, F
(1, 762)=0.10, p=.75, ηG
2 =0.001, and the interaction, F(1,
762)=1.43, p=.23, ηG
2 =0.002, were non-signiﬁcant. More relevant to
our follow up of Study 1, analysis of the consensually agreed Bible aphor-
isms revealed the predicted interaction, F(1, 763)=27.88, p < .001,
ηG
2 =0.04, together with signiﬁcant main eﬀects of worldview, F(1,
763)=161.37, p < .001, ηG
2 =0.17, and source attribution, F(1,
763)=6.34, p=.01, ηG
2 =0.01. Analysis of the quotes from Greek phi-
losophers revealed a signiﬁcant interaction, F(1, 762)=13.25, p < .001,
ηG
2 =0.02, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of worldview, F(1, 762)=74.53,
p < .001, ηG
2 =0.09, and a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of source attribution, F
(1, 762)=9.01, p < .001, ηG
2 =0.01.
3.3. Discussion
As predicted, we found that both atheists and Christians were in-
ﬂuenced by labeling aphorisms as originating from the Bible.
Consensually agreed aphorisms labeled as originating from the Bible
elicited less agreement from atheists and more agreement from
Christians than when they were unattributed. The fact that this eﬀect
was also found for aphorisms from Greek philosophers indicates that
the actual origin of the aphorisms did not matter.
Table 1
Mean (SD in parentheses) agreement with aphorisms as a function of worldview, stimulus type, and source attribution (Study 2).
Source Attribution
Bible No Attrib
Worldview Stimuli M SD M SD df t d U3
Atheist Consensually agreed 4.47 1.03 4.85 0.87 532.00 −4.74⁎⁎⁎ −0.40 34
Consensually disagreed 1.55 0.80 1.58 0.92 544.12 −0.46 −0.04 48
Quotes from philosophers 3.63 0.80 3.59 0.81 551.86 0.58 0.05 52
All aphorisms 3.56 0.72 3.70 0.67 547.35 −2.44⁎⁎ −0.21 42
Christian Consensually agreed 5.74 0.64 5.36 0.85 193.85 3.70⁎⁎⁎ 0.51 69
Consensually disagreed 2.40 1.38 2.23 1.31 216.81 0.90 0.12 55
Quotes from philosophers 4.41 0.85 3.90 0.72 215.77 4.77⁎⁎⁎ 0.64 74
All aphorisms 4.59 0.69 4.19 0.64 218.00 4.50⁎⁎⁎ 0.64 74
Note. Higher means reﬂect greater agreement on a 1–7 scale. ⁎p < .05, ⁎⁎p < .01, ⁎⁎⁎p < .001.
Fig. 2. Mean agreement with aphorisms for atheists and Christians as a function
of source attribution (Study 2).
Note. The response scale ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely
agree).
2 In both samples, seven items assessing attitudes toward Christianity (Maltby & Lewis,
1997) and religious behavior (e.g., frequency of praying) were subsequently measured as
“manipulation checks” (ps < .001) but not further analyzed because Atheists revealed a
strong ﬂoor eﬀect. Additionally, the questionnaire presented to the Christian sample
contained several other measures, which were all presented after the scales relevant here
by researchers who were not part of this project.
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4. Study 3
In Study 3, we examined whether similar results would be found
when Democrats and Republicans are asked to evaluate eight quotes
from Democratic politicians and eight quotes from Republican politi-
cians. These quotes were either correctly attributed to their original
source, incorrectly attributed to a politician from the other party, or
unlabeled. We expected that Democratic and Republican respondents
would diﬀer strongly in their agreement with the quotes when they
were labeled as originating from one party or the other, but not when
the quotes were unlabeled.
We also manipulated the extent to which the respondents thought
about the quotes by varying the amount of time participants were given
to respond. Moreover, we included measures of education and strength
of political preference as potential moderators. Previous research
(Mackie et al., 1992) did not ﬁnd eﬀects of these moderators, but they
were included here for exploratory reasons and because of the im-
portance of replicating null ﬁndings.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Design and participants
We used a between-subjects design, with party aﬃliation (Democrat
vs Republican, continuous variable), source attribution (correctly la-
beled vs incorrectly labeled vs unlabeled), and elaboration (low vs
high) as the factors. Participants were randomly allocated to source
attribution and elaboration. Six hundred twenty-ﬁve participants who a
priori identiﬁed themselves as either liberals or conservatives were
recruited through the online platform Mturk. Two participants were
excluded after failing both attention checks, leaving 623 participants
(51.40% women). The mean age of the sample was 39.66 years
(SD=12.62), and 321 participants (51.50%) reported their educa-
tional level as graduate or above. As in all of our studies, data were
analyzed only after data collection was completed. A sensitivity ana-
lysis showed that our sample was suﬃcient to detect small eﬀects of
f≥ 0.11 with a power of 0.80.
4.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were told that they would be asked to rate the extent of
their agreement or disagreement with each of 16 aphorisms. These
ratings were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree). The aphorisms were from well-known members of
the Democratic party, including four statements from Hillary Clinton,
and from well-known members of the Republican party, including four
statements from Donald Trump. The aphorisms were selected from
various internet sources (e.g., brainyquote.com) and were chosen be-
cause their content was not self-evidently related a speciﬁc party or an
individual politician. Example statements include “American politics is
always an open competition” (Hillary Clinton) and “Our roads and
bridges are falling apart, our airports are in Third World condition, and
forty-three million Americans are on food stamps” (Donald Trump). For
the incorrectly labeled statement condition, we labeled a statement
from a Democratic politician as being from a Republican politician, and
vice versa. To avoid participants responding in an unthinking fashion,
the aphorisms were presented in an alternating order with respect to
their (ostensible) political party origin. In the unlabeled condition, the
aphorisms were not attributed to any source.
To encourage high elaboration, participants were instructed to
“think carefully about each statement, about its meaning, and relevance
for American politics.” We also suppressed the appearance of the “next
page” button by 5 s. In the low elaboration condition, participants were
asked to “answer as fast and accurately as possible.” Finally, the in-
struction given at the top of the screen for each item reminded the
participants to “think carefully” or “respond quickly,” as appropriate.
Next, participants reported their age, gender, and educational level.
We used responses to the latter question to classify participants into two
groups. The lower educated group had an intermediate or post high school
diploma, or less, whereas the higher educated group had a college de-
gree or higher. Political ideology was measured with four items. The
ﬁrst was “When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as
liberal, moderate, conservative, or something else?” and is often used to
measure political ideology (e.g., Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt,
2012). Responses were selected from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very con-
servative), with four additional response alternatives which were not
included in the calculations described below: 8 (don't know), 9 (Not
political), 10 (Libertarian), and 11 (other). The second item was “Which
party do you feel closer to?” Responses were given on a slider measure
ranging from 0 (Democratic party) to 100 (Republican party). The third
and fourth items were “How happy would you be if Hillary Clinton
became president?” and “How happy would you be if Donald Trump
became president?” The last two items were measured on 7-point scales
ranging from 1 (extremely unhappy) to 7 (extremely happy). The four
items measuring political ideology were combined (α=0.95) by
standardizing and summing them. More extreme negative values in-
dicated support for the Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton, while
more extreme positive values indicated support for the Republican
Party and Donald Trump.
Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked. On average, par-
ticipants took six and a half minutes to complete the survey and were
compensated with US$0.70. This study was conducted in the week prior
to the 2016 US elections, on November 2nd and 3rd.
4.2. Results
Of the four possible DVs – aphorisms from Democratic candidates,
aphorisms from Republican candidates, aphorisms from Clinton, and
aphorisms from Trump – we report the results for the aphorisms from
Democratic and Republican candidates. The pattern of results for the
aphorisms from Clinton and Trump were the same (see Table S1 in the
Supplemental materials which replicates Table 2, see below), and the
four aphorisms from Clinton and Trump, respectively, are merely a
subset of the quotes from the Democratic and Republican candidates,
respectively.
We initially examined responses to aphorisms from the Democratic
candidates in a pair of regression analyses and responses to aphorisms
from the Republican candidates in another pair of regression analyses.
The predictor variables in both analyses were source attribution (ca-
tegorical) and political ideology (continuous). A third predictor vari-
able was elaboration in one of the analyses, and education in the other
analysis. Neither elaboration nor education yielded signiﬁcant main
Table 2
Summary of regression analysis with aphorisms from Democratic and
Republican politicians (Study 3).
Aphorisms from
Democrats
Aphorisms from
Republicans
Predictor variable B SE B B SE B
SA (Correct vs no
attribution)
−0.10 0.08 −0.16⁎ 0.07
SA (Incorrect vs no
attribution)
−0.17⁎ 0.08 −0.03 0.07
Political Ideology (PI) 0.16⁎⁎ 0.06 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.06
SA (Correct vs no
attribution)× PI
−0.72⁎⁎⁎ 0.08 0.35⁎⁎⁎ 0.08
SA (Incorrect vs no
attribution)× PI
0.43⁎⁎⁎ 0.08 −0.86⁎⁎⁎ 0.08
Adjusted R2 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎⁎
Note. SA: Source attribution (dummy coded).
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
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eﬀects or interactions (see Tables S2 and S3).3 Therefore, for each de-
pendent variable we computed a regression analysis in which source
attribution, ideology, and their interaction were the predictors. Main
eﬀects of political ideology in each analysis indicated that Republicans
agreed with the aphorisms more than Democrats did. More importantly,
there were reliable two-way interactions (see Table 2). When aphorisms
from Democratic politicians were correctly attributed, Democrats
agreed with them more than when they were not attributed
(B=−0.72). In contrast, when the aphorisms were incorrectly attrib-
uted to Republican politicians, Democrats agreed with them less than
Republicans (B=0.43). The reverse pattern of results was found for
aphorisms from Republican candidates (see Table 2). To illustrate this
eﬀect graphically, Democrats and Republicans were divided into
weaker and stronger supporters of their political party and strength of
agreement with the aphorisms was plotted as a function of source at-
tribution (see Fig. 3). This analysis clearly shows that the eﬀect of
source attribution was stronger among strong party supporters.
4.3. Discussion
Study 3 provided support for the postulated interaction between
party aﬃliation and source attribution. However, while Studies 1 and 2
used general value-laden aphorisms, the aphorisms used in Study 3
were rather policy-relevant rather than value-laden aphorisms. We
therefore ran a further study to test whether the eﬀects of value-laden
aphorisms found in Studies 1 and 2 would be replicated in a political
context.
5. Study 4
In Study 4, we examined whether the same pattern of results as in
Study 3 would be found when supporters of the British Conservative
party and the British Labour party were asked to evaluate ten
consensual aphorisms. These aphorisms were attributed to Theresa
May, the leader of the Conservative Party, to Jeremy Corbyn, the leader
of the Labour Party, or unattributed. As in Study 3, we expected that
Conservative-supporting and Labour-supporting respondents would
diﬀer strongly in their agreement with the aphorisms labeled as origi-
nating from one party or the other, but not when the aphorisms were
unlabeled.
We also took the opportunity to include a range of new moderators
to explore the mechanism underlying this eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, we in-
vestigated whether the eﬀect would be stronger among those who (1)
had greater trust in the leadership of their own party, (2) feared re-
proach from ingroup members for dissent, (3) felt more discomfort
about disagreeing, (4) had a tendency to turn to authorities when un-
certain about their beliefs, and (5) had stronger attitudes about British
politics. We expected that the source attribution eﬀect would be
stronger for people who place higher trust in their leadership, because
previous research showed that trust in leadership is related to belief in
information provided by the leader and commitments to decisions
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). We further expected that the source attribution
eﬀect would be stronger for people who are afraid of reproach from
ingroup members, because being excluded or ostracized is associated
with a range of negative emotions (Donate et al., 2017). For the same
reason, we expected the eﬀect to be stronger for people who feel dis-
comfort about disagreeing: disagreement might lead to reproach. We
expected that people who are uncertain about their beliefs would more
easily turn to authorities and thus show a stronger source attribution
eﬀect because ambiguity intolerance is positively related to conformity-
related constructs, such as dogmatism and rigidity (Mac Donald, 1970).
Finally, we expected that attitude strength would moderate the eﬀect,
because people with a stronger attitude toward politics are more in-
volved in politics (Scheufele, Shanahan, & Kim, 2002) and should
therefore have stronger opinions about statements ostensibly made by
politicians.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Design and participants
We used a between-subjects design, with party aﬃliation
(Conservative vs Labour, continuous variable) and source attribution
Fig. 3. Mean agreement with aphorisms by Democratic (panels A and B) and Republican (C and D) politicians, depending on source attribution, political ideology,
and strength of participants' support for their own party (panels A and C shows results for weaker supporters; panels B and D shows results for stronger supporters;
Study 3).
Note. The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
3 One of the four two-way interaction for elaboration was signiﬁcant: elaboration in-
teracted with source attribution (incorrect vs none) at p= .047 for the aphorisms from
Democrats. However, because the same two-way interaction for aphorisms from
Republicans was not signiﬁcant (p= .75), we do not discuss this ﬁnding further (see
Supplemental materials for a break-down of the two-way interaction).
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(May vs Corbyn vs unlabeled) as factors. Participants were randomly
allocated to one of the source attribution conditions. Six hundred thirty-
four British participants were recruited through the online platform
Proliﬁc. Two participants were excluded because they skipped all items,
leaving 632 participants (490 women, 140 men, 1 other, 1 who pre-
ferred not to say). The mean age of the sample was 29.50 years
(SD=6.66). Data were analyzed only after data collection was com-
pleted. A sensitivity analysis showed that our sample was suﬃcient to
detect small eﬀects of f≥ 0.11 with a power of 0.80.
5.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were told that they would be asked to rate the extent of
their agreement or disagreement with each of 10 aphorisms “from in-
ﬂuential British politicians.” These ratings were made on a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The aphorisms
came from the 40-item Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz
et al., 2001), which measures the importance people attach to values
such as equality, security, or helpfulness as guiding principles in their
life. We selected 10 aphorisms relating to benevolence, security, self-
direction, and universalism, because these are the values that have
consistently been found to be most important across 60 countries
(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Despite this universal hierarchy of values,
previous research found that values are linked to political attitudes. For
example, center-right voters score higher on security, while center-left
voters score higher on universalism and benevolence (Caprara,
Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006). Eﬀect sizes were
small, however (−0.20 < r < 0.28 with the largest eﬀect found for
universalism). Translating the largest eﬀect size to Cohen's d and then
to a distribution overlap estimate (Inman & Bradley, 1989), still 77% of
people on diﬀerent ends of the political left-right continuum none-
theless agree with the importance of these values. It is therefore plau-
sible for the same value assertions to be presented as quotes from
Corbyn in one condition and from May in the other condition.
Some of the aphorisms were slightly adapted to make them sound
more like a quote. Example aphorisms include “It is important that
every person in the world is treated equally,” “It is better to be loyal to
our friends,” and “We should avoid anything that might endanger our
safety” (see Supplemental materials for a list of all aphorisms). The
aphorisms were presented as quotes from Theresa May, Jeremy Corbyn,
or were unlabeled (control condition). To avoid participants responding
in an unthinking fashion, the aphorisms were presented in an alter-
nating order with respect to their ostensible political party (see
Supplemental materials). The ten aphorisms were divided into two sets
of ﬁve: The ﬁrst set consisted of the odd-numbered aphorisms, whereas
the second set consisted of all the even-numbered aphorisms. Because
the initial order of the aphorisms was randomized, this division is also
random. Participants saw only one of these two sets, because otherwise
they would have seen the same aphorism twice, once attributed to
Corbyn, once to May. This design enabled an internal replication of our
ﬁndings. Thus, the design was the same design as the one used in Study
3, except that here the aphorisms were not actual quotes.
Each of the ﬁve moderators was measured as follows. Trust in the
leadership of one's own party was measured with “How much do you
trust politicians of your party on average?” and “How much conﬁdence
do you have in politicians of your party on average?” (α=0.87). Being
afraid of reproach from ingroup members for dissidence was measured
with “Do you believe that supporters of your party would judge you
harshly for disagreeing with them?” and “Do you fear reproach from
supporters of your party for dissenting with them?” (α=0.60). Feeling
discomfort about disagreeing was measured with “Do you feel dis-
comfort if you disagree with the oﬃcial line of the party you are sup-
porting?” and “Do you feel stressed if you disagree with the oﬃcial line
of the party you are supporting?” (α=0.78). The tendency to turn to
authorities when uncertain about one's beliefs was measured with
“Does listening to leading politicians from your party make you feel
more certain about your beliefs?” and “Do you feel uncertain about
your own view on political issues without having listened to leading
politicians of your party?” (α=0.15). Because of the low internal
consistency of this latter measure, we used each item as a separate
moderator.4 Attitude strength toward British politics was measured
with the 4-item scale of Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005). Example
items include “How important is British politics to you personally?”
(attitude importance), and “How much are your feelings about British
politics connected to your core moral beliefs or convictions?” (moral
conviction; α=0.90). All items were measured on a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal/very much).
Finally, we measured political ideology with adapted versions of the
four items used in Study 3 (α=0.89), and also asked whether parti-
cipants had spoken to someone about this questionnaire who had al-
ready completed it, and how convinced they were that the aphorisms
actually came from May and Corbyn (1: a great deal to 5: none at all).
Because only three participants reported that they had spoken to
someone who had already completed the survey (625 answered no, 1
unsure, and 3 missing), this item was not considered further (the pat-
tern of results reported in Table 3 remained the same when only par-
ticipants who answered no were included, see Table S4). The data were
collected together with data for an unrelated study. In this other study,
which preceded Study 4, participants described children and then
completed measures of goals, values, and prosocial behavior.
5.2. Results
We ﬁrst tested separately, for each of the three conditions, whether
the aphorisms were consensually endorsed. As expected, participants
agreed signiﬁcantly with all aphorisms, regardless of political ideology:
In 30 one-sample t-tests (one per aphorism in each condition) com-
paring mean agreement with the scale mid-point of 4, all results were
signiﬁcant (all ps < .001, Ms= 4.69–6.21).
To test whether the eﬀect observed in previous studies would re-
plicate, we then examined responses to both sets of aphorisms in two
pairs of regression analyses, with the dependent variable being the
mean agreement to each set of statements. The predictor variables were
source attribution (categorical) and political ideology (continuous,
lower values indicating greater support for the Labour Party). Table 3
shows some interesting main eﬀects: Participants agreed more on
average with the aphorisms when they were unattributed than when
they were labeled as coming from either May or Corbyn, as reﬂected in
the negative coeﬃcients for the source attribution main eﬀects. More
relevant to our predictions, the interactions of condition with political
Table 3
Summary of regression analysis with consensual aphorisms.
Aphorisms set 1 Aphorisms set 2
Predictor variable B SE B B SE B
SA (May vs no attribution) −0.25⁎⁎ 0.08 −0.03 0.08
SA (Corbyn vs no attribution) −0.18⁎ 0.08 −0.32⁎⁎⁎ 0.08
Political ideology (PI) −0.09 0.06 0.03 0.06
SA (May vs no attribution)×PI 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.09
SA (Corbyn vs no attribution)×PI −0.38⁎⁎⁎ 0.10 −0.49⁎⁎⁎ 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.11⁎⁎⁎
Note. SA: Source attribution of quotes (dummy coded), PI: political ideology.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
4 Re-assessing these two items after data collection had been completed led us to
question whether they measured the intended construct of turning to authorities when
uncertain about one's beliefs. We therefore report the results for these moderators in the
Supplemental Materials only (all interactions with the two items were non-signiﬁcant).
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ideology revealed that Labour supporters agreed more with both sets of
aphorisms, and Conservative supporters agreed with them less, when
they were labeled as coming from Corbyn than when they were un-
labeled. However, contrary to expectations, this eﬀect was not found
when the aphorisms were labeled as coming from May. Nonetheless, a
comparison of agreement with aphorisms labeled as coming from May
with agreement with the same aphorisms labeled as coming from
Corbyn again revealed the expected two-way interaction. For Set 1, the
interaction between source attribution and political ideology was sig-
niﬁcant (B=−0.44, SE=0.10, p < .001), as was the corresponding
interaction for Set 2 (B=−0.63, SE=0.10, p < .001), indicating that
Labour-supporting respondents agreed more when aphorisms were la-
beled as quotes from Corbyn and less when labeled as quotes from May
(and vice versa for Conservative-supporting respondents).
To illustrate this eﬀect graphically, Conservative- supporting re-
spondents and Labour-supporting respondents were divided into
weaker and stronger supporters of their political party and strength of
agreement with the aphorisms was plotted as a function of source at-
tribution (see Fig. 4). Panels B and D clearly show that the eﬀect was
driven by stronger supporters.
In a next step, we repeated the regression analyses four times, one
per moderator. Each moderator was included as a third (continuous)
predictor. All but one of the eight three-way interactions were non-
signiﬁcant, showing that trust in leadership, fear of reproach from in-
group, discomfort about disagreeing with ingroup, and attitude strength
all failed to moderate the eﬀect. The one signiﬁcant three-way inter-
action involved political ideology, discomfort about disagreeing and
extent of agreement with the second set of aphorisms (B=−0.12,
SE=0.06, p= .03). However, because this was the only signiﬁcant
eﬀect out of ten three-way interactions, and because it did not replicate
with the ﬁrst set of aphorisms (B=0.02, SE=0.06, p= .71), we re-
gard this as a chance result.
Finally, we tested whether the degree of conviction that the
aphorisms actually came from May and Corbyn exerted a moderating
eﬀect. Here we found a signiﬁcant three-way interaction for the ﬁrst set
of items (B=−0.30, SE=0.09, p= .001). Further analyses revealed
that the two-way interaction reported in Table 3 was weakest for par-
ticipants who exhibited more doubt that the aphorisms were from
Corbyn or May (+1SD above the mean or greater) (B=−0.15,
SE=0.23, p= .53), moderate for participants who were within one
standard deviation of the mean, (B=−0.37, SE=0.11, p= .001), and
strongest for those who least doubted the ostensible origin of the
aphorisms (−1SD below the mean or less), (B=−1.07, SE=0.29,
p < .001). However, this three-way interaction was not signiﬁcant for
the second set of items (B=−0.08, SE=0.09, p= .39). Thus, there
was no consistent evidence regarding the moderating eﬀect of self-rated
degree of conviction about the source.
5.3. Discussion
In Study 4, we found that supporters of the Labour party agreed
more with the aphorisms when they were attributed to Corbyn, the
leader of their own party, than when they were attributed to the leader
of the Conservative party, with the reverse pattern of eﬀects being
observed among supporters of the Conservative party. However, when
the source attribution factor involved a comparison with the control
group, this eﬀect was only found for aphorisms labeled as quotes from
Corbyn. We suggest that this ﬁnding arose because Corbyn is a more
polarizing political leader than May in the UK. Corbyn's leadership has
focused on relatively radical new initiatives to increase governmental
social and infrastructural investment (e.g., eliminating university tui-
tion fees; higher taxes on the wealthy; nationalizing the railways),
whereas May's leadership is focused on attempting to reconcile between
diﬀerent wings of her own party and on reaching an agreement with the
European Union. Our ﬁndings suggest that Corbyn's alleged views at-
tract greater endorsement from supporters and greater rejection from
opponents than when the same views are unattributed. None of the four
possible moderators we considered was found to have a signiﬁcant
moderating inﬂuence. However, there was some evidence, albeit not
consistent for the two sets of aphorisms, that this eﬀect was weaker
among participants who more strongly doubted whether the aphorisms
actually came from Corbyn or May. This is not wholly surprising: If
reliable, it probably reﬂects a tendency for experimental eﬀects to be
weaker among participants who doubt the cover story.
6. General discussion
The aim of the present research was to test whether agreement with
Fig. 4. Mean agreement with aphorisms, depending on source attribution, political ideology, and strength of participants' support for their own party. Panels A and C
shows results for weaker supporters; panels B and D shows results for stronger supporters. Panels A and B show the results for the ﬁrst set of ﬁve aphorisms, panels C
and D for the second set of ﬁve aphorisms (internal replication; Study 4).
Note. The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
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consensually endorsed, non-divisive aphorisms is reduced when they
are thought to originate from a rival group, even when the aphorisms in
question originate from one's own group. In all four studies, we found
that aphorisms presented as originating from the ingroup elicited
greater agreement than the same aphorisms presented without attri-
bution (except for aphorisms attributed to May in Study 4); likewise,
the same aphorisms presented as originating from the outgroup elicited
less agreement than when they were presented without attribution.
These eﬀects occurred across atheists and Christians in Studies 1 and 2
and across respondents with right-leaning and left-leaning political
views in Studies 3 and 4. This ﬁnding that “both sides” are biased is in
line with recent ﬁndings (Ditto et al., 2017; Frimer et al., 2017; Proulx
& Brandt, 2017). For example, conservatives and liberals are equally
motivated to reject attitude-inconsistent scientiﬁc ﬁndings (Washburn
& Skitka, 2017).
It is worth noting that these eﬀects occurred independently of
whether the information about the source of the aphorisms was correct
or incorrect: The inﬂuence of actual statement content and source was
overwhelmed by their ostensible source. Nonetheless, there was also a
diﬀerence in the extent to which unattributed aphorisms were endorsed
by atheists and Christians (Study 2) or by Democrats and Republicans
(Study 3), such that participants sometimes agreed more with aphor-
isms that actually originated from their ingroup than with aphorisms
originating from an outgroup. In Study 2, Christians may have been
more familiar than atheists with the style in which biblical aphorisms
and quotes from ancient Greek philosophers are written, and this might
have increased their tendency to endorse such aphorisms through a
mere-exposure eﬀect (Zajonc, 1968). In Study 3, some aphorisms did
contain references to nationalism and patriotism, which may be why
Republicans, who tend to be more nationalistic than Democrats (e.g.,
Haidt & Graham, 2007), endorsed the aphorisms to a greater extent
than did Democrats in the control condition. Nonetheless, although the
content of the aphorisms exerted a small inﬂuence on agreement in
some groups, this eﬀect was much smaller than the consistent eﬀect of
source attribution. This suggests that we ascribe diﬀerent meaning to a
statement as a function of its source (cf. Kunda, 1990), or that its social
meaning was diﬀerently inferred (Cohen, 2003).
In Studies 3 and 4, this source attribution eﬀect was signiﬁcantly
moderated by strength of political preference: The eﬀect was more
evident among stronger supporters than weaker ones. However, Studies
1 and 3 revealed that the eﬀect was not moderated by spontaneous
versus deliberative processing (i.e., being encouraged and being given
the opportunity to engage in deeper thought about the aphorisms). The
fact that the ﬁndings observed in Studies 1 and 3 were not moderated
by thoughtful elaboration suggests that the eﬀect of ingroup or out-
group sources was not dependent on the degree of thought about the
assertions. Thinking about the assertions more does not attenuate or
increase the role of the source, perhaps because sources in general can
be a simple cue to agreement under low elaboration, while being a
biasing factor under high elaboration (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Educational attainment moderated the source attribution eﬀect in
Study 1, but not in Study 3. This diﬀerence may have arisen because the
political divide just before the 2016 US election, when data for Study 3
were collected, was arguably greater than the religious divide in spring
2014, when the data for Study 1 were collected. These ﬁndings are
reminiscent of research on the polarization of views regarding scientiﬁc
controversies, such as climate change. For example, Kahan and col-
leagues found that numerical ability helped people to interpret scien-
tiﬁc results more correctly when the topic of the research (skin rash
treatment) was not associated with cultural values or group identity,
but not when the research topic (gun control) was associated with
cultural values and group identity (Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic,
2017). Indeed, polarization in the latter context was greater among
those with higher numeracy scores. Similar to theories aﬃrming the
cognitive centrality of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-
categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), Kahan and colleagues
explain their results in terms of ‘identity protective cognition,’ which
they describe as “a psychic self-defense mechanism that steers in-
dividuals away from beliefs that could alienate them from others on
whose support they depend in myriad domains of everyday life” (p.
56f). The diﬀerences between Kahan and colleagues' ﬁndings and those
of our Study 1 therefore raise the possibility that education may play
diﬀerent roles in moderating reactions to information that is inherently
polarizing, as opposed to reactions to information that is only polar-
izing by virtue of its source. Educated participants in the Kahan et al.
study used their “quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conﬁrm
their interpretation of the data” (Kahan et al., 2017, p. 54) when as-
sessing polarizing statements. By contrast, when assessing consensual
aphorisms that were attributed to a polarizing source, such as the Bible,
more educated atheists in our Study 1 appear to have focused on the
content of the aphorism, rather than its source. However, it is worth
repeating that the moderating eﬀect of education was not observed in
Study 3, and also worth bearing in mind that ‘numerical ability’ and
‘educational attainment’ are constructs that may not be strongly cor-
related.
The present ﬁndings show that something akin to an identity pro-
tection process applies even when people are asked about their agree-
ment with uncontroversial aphorisms. Indeed, 71% of atheists and
Christians responded the same way to the unlabeled aphorisms (Study
2), as did 83% of Democrats and Republicans (Study 3), and 94% of the
Conservative and Labour supporters (Study 4).5 By contrast, when the
aphorisms were accompanied by a source attribution, the extent of si-
milarity in responding decreased to 47% for atheists and Christians,
55% for Democrats and Republicans, and 84% for supporters of the
Conservative and Labour parties. Clearly, agreement across religious
and political ideological groups can occur, but it has a far better chance
of doing so when group identity is not engaged. Unfortunately, identity
protective cognition in this context is particularly pernicious, because it
seems unlikely that members of diﬀerent ideological groups will agree
on controversial issues when they cannot even agree on relatively
consensual, value-aﬃrming aphorisms. Finding common ground in
political discourse will be diﬃcult to achieve unless we can identify
ways in which group ideologies can be disentangled from dialogue, a
challenge that several investigators are beginning to tackle (e.g., http://
humilityandconviction.uconn.edu).
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